Killer Apps: Vanishing Messages, Encrypted Communications, and Challenges to Freedom of Information Laws When Public Officials  Go Dark by Stewart, Daxton R.
  
 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET • VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2019 
 
 
 
KILLER APPS: VANISHING MESSAGES, 
ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS, AND 
CHALLENGES TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS 
WHEN PUBLIC OFFICIALS “GO DARK”  
 
Dr. Daxton R. Stewart1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Government officials such as White House staffers and the Missouri governor have 
been communicating among themselves and leaking to journalists using apps such 
as Signal and Confide, which allow users to encrypt messages or to make them 
vanish after they are received. By using these apps, government officials are "going 
dark" by avoiding detection of their communications in a way that undercuts 
freedom of information laws. This article explores the challenges presented by 
government employee use of encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps by 
examining three policy approaches: (1) banning use of the apps, (2) enhancing 
existing archiving and record-keeping practices, or (3) legislatively expanding 
quasi-government body definitions. Each of these approaches will be analyzed as 
potential ways to manage the threat presented by “killer apps” to open records laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In Donald J. Trump’s first month in the White House, staffers concerned 
about accusations of leaking information to the press “resorted to a secret chat app 
– Confide – that erases messages as soon as they’re read.”2 After the email hacks 
that haunted Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign in 2016, the Confide app 
became “the tool of choice for Republicans in Washington” fearing a similar fate.3 
White House press secretary Sean Spicer, who began random phone checks shortly 
after the Washington Post revelation, reportedly told staffers that using Confide and 
the encrypted messaging app Signal were potential violations of the Presidential 
Records Act.4 In response to these reports, the House Oversight Committee issued 
a letter to fifty-five federal agencies expressing concerns that the use of Signal, 
Confide, and WhatsApp by federal employees “could result in the creation of 
federal records that would be unlikely or impossible to preserve” and may allow 
                                               
2 Ashley Parker & Philip Rucker, Upheaval is Now Standard Operating Procedure Inside the 
White House, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/upheaval-is-
now-standard-operating-procedure-inside-the-white-house/2017/02/13/d65dee58-f213-11e6-a9b0-
ecee7ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.b1940d392beb.  
3 David McCabe & Jonathan Swan, Confide: The App for Paranoid Republicans, AXIOS, (Feb. 8, 
2017), https://www.axios.com/confide-the-new-app-for-paranoid-republicans-2246297664.html.  
4 Annie Karni & Alex Isenstadt, Sean Spicer Targets Own Staff in Leak Crackdown, POLITICO 
(Feb. 26, 2017, 5:25 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/sean-spicer-targets-own-staff-
in-leak-crackdown-235413.  
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“circumventing requirements established by federal recordkeeping and 
transparency laws.”5 Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) 
filed suit against Trump, alleging violation of the Presidential Records Act by using 
encrypted disappearing-messaging apps.6 During ethics training in 2018, White 
House lawyers advised personnel not to use encrypted messaging apps such as 
WhatsApp while conducting government business.7 
Similar issues have trickled down to the states as well. In Missouri, two 
attorneys sued then-Governor Eric Greitens, arguing that his use of Confide 
violated the state’s public records law.8 A county judge denied their request for a 
temporary restraining order to halt Greitens’s use of Confide, in part, because of a 
lack of evidence that he had been using it to conduct government business, but 
noted that there were “a whole bunch of open questions here,” including whether 
the governor has a First Amendment right to use the app to communicate, as his 
attorneys contended.9 
         State open records laws, the federal Freedom of Information Act, and the 
Presidential Records Act are intended to protect the public’s right to know about 
government officials’ conduct. However, the development of privacy-protecting 
mobile applications that deliberately make archiving and retrieval difficult creates 
a unique challenge for these transparency laws. 
Vanishing message apps, such as Snapchat and Confide, allow public 
officials, using these apps as intended, to have messages disappear automatically 
without a way to keep a record for public inspection. Bob Freeman, the long-time 
executive director of New York state’s Committee on Open Government, described 
                                               
5 Letter from Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, and Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, House of 
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to Kathleen McGettigan, 
Acting Director, Office of Personnel Management (Mar. 8, 2017), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/2017-03-08-JEC-EEC-to-McGettigan-OPM-Federal-Records-Act-due-3-
22.pdf  
6 Josh Gerstein, Judge Hears Suit on Trump White House Use of Encrypted Apps, POLITICO (Jan. 
17, 2018, 1:12 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/17/white-house-encrypted-apps-
hearing-343774.  
7 Carol D. Leonnig, Josh Dawsey & Ashley Parker, Ethics Training Reminds White House Staff 
Not to Use Encrypted Messages for Government Business, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ethics-training-reminds-white-house-staff-not-to-use-
encrypted-messages-for-government-business/2018/02/04/7636265c-05eb-11e8-94e8-
e8b8600ade23_story.html?utm_term=.0d04a080becd.  
8 Cyrus Farivar, Judge Should Order Governor to Stop Using Ephemeral App, Lawyers Say, 
ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2018, 6:03 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/02/lawyers-
governors-secret-messaging-app-use-violates-public-records-laws/.  
9 Jason Hancock, No Immediate Ban on Greitens’ Use of Secret Text App, but Judge Has More 
Questions, KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 2, 2018), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article198113764.html.  
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the dangers: “If an individual, including a government official, wants to cover his 
tracks, tell the world, ‘I never said that,’ or that he never communicated with a 
certain person…Snapchat, for better or worse, can be used to make it seem true. 
And there may be nothing we can do about it.”10 
Encrypted messaging apps, such as WhatsApp and Signal, offer a similar 
challenge, one that former FBI Director James Comey has called “Going Dark.” 
Comey, speaking about the challenges of investigating and preventing crime when 
people have the ability to use technology to obscure themselves and their activities, 
largely through encryption, has said, “We have the legal authority to intercept and 
access communications pursuant to a court order, but we often lack the technical 
ability to do so.”11 
The same legal communication tools that citizens can use to avoid detection 
and surveillance are also available to government employees, who now appear to 
be “going dark” in their communications as part of their official jobs. This is not 
the first time a new digital communication technology has created a challenge for 
government record-keeping and accessibility under open records laws. But, in the 
past, such new technologies – email, private online chat rooms, text messaging, and 
private messaging through social networks, to name a few – merely offered 
obscurity as a secondary effect of the messaging system. Ultimately, the messages 
could be found and subjected to public scrutiny, though doing so may be difficult 
and time-consuming, and new rules have had to be put in place to account for 
archiving and providing a means of access to the public. 
However, apps such as Snapchat and Confide provide automatic deletion of 
messages after they are read as a core benefit. Similarly, encrypted messaging 
systems make transparency difficult because people seeking access to those records 
would need the key to be able to read them. These features have the potential to be 
deadly to public records laws, providing an easy way for government officials to 
dodge public scrutiny without any trace of their subversion. 
         The purpose of this article is to examine the implications of vanishing 
messaging and encrypted messaging apps for freedom of information laws and to 
propose potential policy revisions to handle the challenges these apps present. After 
briefly reviewing how the apps work, three potential policy approaches are 
examined, using legal research methodology to consider the possible remedies that 
may be available to legislators and regulators to prevent “killer apps” from 
                                               
10 Robert J. Freeman, In a “Poof,” Snapchat Puts Public Records Laws to Test, KNOXVILLE NEWS 
SENTINEL (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.knoxnews.com/story/opinion/valley-
views/2016/03/15/poof-snapchat-puts-public-records-laws-test/81656774/.  
11 Brookings Institution, Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8BSr3XqVwE. 
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undermining the goals of freedom of information laws. Finally, these policy 
approaches are reviewed for their potential application to the Public Information 
Act, the open records law in Texas.  
 
I. PRIVACY-PROMISING TECHNOLOGIES 
       
At issue are two distinct kinds of communication technology, encryption 
and ephemeral messaging, that allow users to make records of their discussions 
harder to observe or retain. Jasmine McNealy and Heather Schoenberger have 
conceptualized these as “privacy-promising technologies,” a definition that 
includes “technology, such as apps, software, and online tools, in which the maker 
or creator uses the promise of privacy, or data control, to induce users to use their 
digital tool.”12 While the authors were writing primarily about apps that either 
promised anonymity (such as YikYak or Whisper) or provided automatic message 
deletion (such as Snapchat), it makes sense as a concept to extend the definition to 
apps that protect user communications from outside scrutiny through encryption as 
well. 
Government use of impermanent messaging apps is becoming 
commonplace. Presidential contenders Jeb Bush, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie 
Sanders had Snapchat accounts, and the app has become popular among members 
of Congress, including “Snapchat King of Congress” Eric Swalwell, a 
representative from California.13 
Snapchat users include Washington, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser and Los 
Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti,14 as well as Chicago Police Superintendent Eddie 
Johnson.15 And government use has not been without controversy. The New York 
Police Department, for instance, had to investigate an officer who posted images 
on Snapchat during a Brooklyn apartment raid. The posted Snapchats depicted a 
family in handcuffs with captions such as “Merry Christmas it’s NYPD!” and 
“Warrant Sweeps it’s still a part smh.”16 Beyond the White House examples 
                                               
12 Jasmine McNealy & Heather Schoenberger, Reconsidering Privacy-Promising Technologies, 19 
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2-3 (2016). 
13 Taylor Lorenz, How Rep. Eric Swalwell Became the Snapchat King of Congress, THE HILL 
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/277737-swalwell-snapchat.  
14 Eric Hal Schwartz, Why DC’s Mayor Joined Snapchat, DC INNO (Apr. 11, 2016), 
http://dcinno.streetwise.co/2016/04/11/dc-mayor-muriel-bowser-joins-snapchat-social-media/.  
15 Kim Janssen, Snapchat Is No Snap for Chicago’s Old School Top Cop, CHI. TRIB. (June 21, 
2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chicagoinc/ct-eddie-johnson-snapchat-20160621-
story.html.  
16 Shachar Peled, NYPD Suspends Cop who Allegedly Posted Snapchat of Handcuffed Family, 
CNN (Dec. 26, 2016, 9:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/snapchat-arrest-trnd/.  
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mentioned above, public officials have also been using encryption apps in other 
contexts. The mayor and city attorney of Chattanooga, Tennessee, for instance, both 
admitted using WhatsApp to communicate for government business purposes, 
drawing the attention of transparency advocates.17 
However, legal research on these privacy-promising technologies has not 
yet extended into their implications for transparency laws such as the federal 
Freedom of Information Act and state open records laws. Below, encryption and 
ephemeral messaging are briefly described in terms of function and legal analysis 
to date. 
 
A. Encryption Tools 
 
For centuries, cryptography has existed as a way to transmit messages that 
are only decipherable to the intended receiver, and are indecipherable to an 
interceptor. Modern encryption technology intends to keep electronic data and 
communications safe from interception and surveillance by third parties.18 Simply 
put, encryption allows its users to restrict who can read a message to those who 
have the key. Encryption tools, such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) and GPG (Gnu 
Privacy Guard), allow users to create encryption keys for email platforms. This 
allows users to communicate without fear that someone without a key can intercept 
and read their communications. Edward Snowden used GPG to contact Micah Lee, 
a technologist for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who helped Snowden connect 
with documentary journalist Laura Poitras. They used GPG encryption to protect 
their communications and ultimately to facilitate the leak of National Security 
Agency documents that revealed illegal spying practices.19 
In the past few years, encryption tools have become simpler to use through 
the development of smartphone apps. Signal, launched in 2013 by Open Whisper 
Systems, allows encrypted communications via text messages through an “idiot-
proof interface, which . . . is just as straightforward as normal calling and texting.”20 
                                               
17 Paul Leach, Chattanooga Mayor Admits Using Encrypted Messaging App to Converse with 
Staff, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2016/sep/27/mayor-andy-berke-admits-using-
encrypted-messa/388807/.  
18 Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. L. J. 989, 993 (2018). 
19 Micah Lee, Ed Snowden Taught Me to Smuggle Secrets Past Incredible Danger. Now I Teach 
You, INTERCEPT (Oct. 28, 2014, 1:36 PM), https://theintercept.com/2014/10/28/smuggling-
snowden-secrets/.  
20 Andy Greenberg, Signal, the Snowden-approved Crypto App, Comes to Android, WIRED (Nov. 
2, 2015, 8:06 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/11/signals-snowden-approved-phone-crypto-app-
comes-to-android/.  
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Instead of the key exchange in PGP and GPG, all Signal requires is that users accept 
invitations from other users through their phone numbers, and the app encrypts their 
messages. By password-protecting their phones, users provide the first layer of 
protection; somebody hoping to access the conversations on Signal must guess or 
hack the phone passcode to access the app. Signal itself keeps no records of the 
communications that could be demanded by government or other third parties. The 
chat app WhatsApp, the most popular chat app worldwide with more than 1 billion 
users, adopted Open Whisper Systems’s Signal technology to provide encryption 
by default for its users starting in 2014 on Apple devices, and extended to all users 
by 2016.21 
By default, Signal and WhatsApp provide end-to-end encryption, placing 
keys “solely in the hands of device holders” in a way that “significantly disrupts 
traditional forms of surveillance that have relied on third parties’ 
(telecommunication providers and ISPs) having access to communications content, 
at least in most circumstances.”22 The main way for the government to access the 
information on these devices is by getting a “backdoor” from the tech company that 
develops the encryption software. The companies are reluctant to provide 
“backdoor[s]” in the name of protecting their users’ privacy.23 Most famously, in 
2016, Apple resisted a Justice Department request to decrypt the iPhone belonging 
to a terrorist attack suspect in San Bernardino, California. The government’s move 
drew the opposition of “[a]lmost every major technology company…including 
Facebook, Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, AT&T, and Twitter.”24 Nearly 
every Justice Department effort to compel Apple to decrypt its devices, including 
obtaining a court order requiring decryption, failed to achieve Apple’s compliance. 
                                               
21 Ellen Nakashima, WhatsApp, the Messaging Service, Announces Full Encryption on all 
Platforms, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/whatsapp-the-messaging-service-announces-full-encryption-on-all-
platforms/2016/04/05/80f071f6-fb3e-11e5-9140-
e61d062438bb_story.html?utm_term=.11e0fdac6186.  
22 Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get What 
It Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J. OF L. & TECH. 599, 
625 (2016). 
23 Kerr and Schneier detail six different ways of the government breaking encryption for law 
enforcement purposes: “find the key, guess the key, compel the key, exploit a flaw in the 
encryption scheme, access plaintext when the device is in use, and locate a plaintext copy.” See 
Kerr & Schneier, supra note 17 at 22 (suggesting that a backdoor is a way of exploiting a flaw in 
encryption). 
24 Id. at 38. 
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Ultimately, the Justice Department turned to paying private hackers about $1 
million to access the information.25 
Encryption tools can be described as “dual use” technologies with both 
positive and negative functions.26 Kerr and Schneier discuss how criminals may use 
encryption technology to conceal evidence, but the government often uses the same 
technology to “maintain the privacy of valuable government data,” and thwart 
criminal efforts to break the encryption.27 Similarly, these tools can be and have 
been used to enable encrypted communications involving government officials, 
which triggers potential issues under open government laws. 
  
B. Ephemeral Messaging Apps 
 
The innovation of disappearing messaging launched Snapchat from a 
startup in 2011 to one of the most popular social media apps today, with an average 
of 158 million daily users by the end of 2016.28 Snapchat’s key feature is that a user 
can send images and captions that vanish after viewing, challenging the notion that 
whatever is posted online is permanent.29 Snapchat users frown upon subverting 
the disappearing nature of photos through taking screenshots or otherwise capturing 
photos before they vanish, one of the “unwritten rules” of the platform.30 Snapchat 
notifies users when someone has taken a screenshot of a photo or video. Snapchat’s 
community guidelines note, “it’s okay with us if someone takes a screenshot, but 
we can’t speak for you or your friends.”31 The disappearing message feature has 
                                               
25 Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San Bernardino 
iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino-
iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-11e6-9d36-
33d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.806637c69a3d.  
26 Kerr & Schneier, supra note 17, at 995. 
27 Id. 
28 Michael J. de la Merced & Katie Benner, Snapchat Parent Showcases Its Strength in 
Preparation for I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/dealbook/snapchat-ipo-nyse.html.  
29 Haley Tsukayama, Snapchat Processes 150 Million Images Per Day, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/snapchat-handles-150-million-
images-per-day/2013/04/16/6732c3f0-a69f-11e2-8302-
3c7e0ea97057_story.html?utm_term=.436f15e5c542.  
30 Kevin Smith, These Are The 17 Most Annoying Things On Snapchat, BUZZFEED (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/kevinsmith/17-unwritten-rules-of-
snapchat?utm_term=.luY4X0AYD#.jizDkgmYV. 
31 Community Guidelines, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/guidelines (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
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become so popular that other platforms are introducing similar features, such as 
Instagram’s direct messaging system.32 
The Confide app, which became popular among White House staffers in the 
early days of the Trump administration,33 combines both encryption and ephemeral 
messaging features. As the developers note, Confide “uses military-grade end-to-
end encryption to keep your messages safe and ensure they can only be read by the 
intended recipients” and is “ephemeral” by making messages “disappear forever 
after they are read once” and protecting them against screenshots.34 As the attorneys 
trying to prevent Missouri Gov. Greitens from using Confide argued, “Confide has 
a singular purpose. To shred. To destroy. To destroy communications sent and 
received.”35 
One benefit of an “ephemeral conduit” like Snapchat is that it provides 
online obscurity to users that is not otherwise available through social networking 
tools.36 Jonathan Moore referred to Snapchat and similar apps as “ephemeral” or 
“impermanent social media.” Because the messages are ephemeral, using them as 
evidence in litigation presents a challenge to the courts.37 
While legal research on ephemeral messaging has touched on privacy 
implications and evidence, research has not yet analyzed the ramifications on 
government record-keeping and freedom of information laws. The next section 
presents law and policy considerations of ephemeral and encrypted messaging apps 
in the context of freedom of information laws. 
 
II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY APPROACHES 
 
The core purpose of freedom of information laws is to provide citizens 
access to government records, including communications between public 
employees, as a means of ensuring transparency. The core purpose of encryption 
                                               
32 Natalie Jervey, Snapchat vs. Instagram: Who’s Copying Whom Most?, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 
1, 2016, 7:00 AM PST), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/snapchat-instagram-whos-
copying-951224.  
33 Lily Hay Newman, Encryption Apps Help White House Staffers Leak – And Maybe Break the 
Law, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2017, 12:43 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/white-house-encryption-
confide-app/.  
34 Features, CONFIDE, https://getconfide.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2017). 
35 Hancock, supra note 8. 
36 Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1343, 1358 (2015). 
37 Moore suggests an approach that recognizes parties’ privacy expectations and limits the scope 
of discovery ordered by courts through a proportionality test, which would consider privacy 
effects, the breadth of such requests, any potential chilling effect on potential litigants, and the 
burden that producing such content would cause the parties. Jonathan E. Moore, Social Media 
Discovery: It’s a Matter of Proportion, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 403, 418-19 (2014). 
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and impermanent messaging apps is to shield communications between people 
from outside scrutiny by making them impossible to read or by making them 
vanish. These core principles are in conflict, and current laws and policies regarding 
government record-keeping and archiving are struggling to keep up with 
communication technology that is growing in popularity among citizens and 
government officials. 
Here, three potential approaches policy makers could take are addressed, 
each with its own legal and practical challenges: (1) Ban use of these apps by public 
officials; (2) Enhance and adapt archiving demands already in place to address the 
new technologies; and/or (3) Treat the companies that offer the technologies as 
quasi-governmental agencies to make it possible to access the archives they 
maintain. 
  
A. Ban on Use of Encryption and Ephemeral Messaging Apps 
  
One response could be a ban on use of encrypted and ephemeral messaging 
apps, either through legislation or judicial action. Reports suggest the White House 
cracked down on staffers using Signal and Confide to talk amongst themselves and 
to journalists. Reports also noted that former White House press secretary Sean 
Spicer considered the use of these apps for official communications a violation of 
the Federal Records Act, though he did not publicly comment on whether using the 
apps had been forbidden by the administration.38 The attorneys seeking an 
injunction against Greitens similarly argued in favor of a ban on government 
officials using apps that operate in direct conflict with the Missouri’s open records 
law. 
Greitens’s lawyers argued that such a ban on government employee speech 
would trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Several courts recognize a First 
Amendment right to use the Internet and social networks to communicate. This 
recognition is particularly relevant for sex offenders who have challenged bars on 
their access to social media. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized a 
convicted sex offender’s First Amendment right to access the Internet in 2005, 
striking down a provision of his release that would “completely bar his access to 
computers and the Internet” as overly broad.39 Likewise, a federal district court in 
Louisiana struck down Louisiana’s law barring sex offenders from “unlawful use 
or access of social media” because it essentially served as “a near total ban on 
                                               
38 Dylan Byers, Spicer Cracks Down on White House Leaks, CNN (last updated Feb. 27, 2017, 
4:30 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/26/politics/spicer-leaks-crackdown/.  
39 U.S. v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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Internet access” that “unreasonably restricts many ordinary activities that have 
become important to everyday life in today’s world.”40 The U.S. Supreme Court in 
2017 struck down a North Carolina state law restricting access to “a commercial 
social networking Web site where the sex offender knows that the site permits 
minor children to become members” in a case in which the defendant, a sex 
offender, used Facebook.41 Recognizing the broad free speech interests in Internet 
communications within the “fabric of our modern society and culture,” the Supreme 
Court noted that “foreclos[ing] access to social media altogether prevents a citizen 
from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.”42 The North 
Carolina law was significantly narrower than provisions struck down by federal 
courts in Louisiana43 and Nebraska,44 not covering social networking services that 
provide only one service, such as photo sharing, e-mail, or instant messaging.45 
One might expect that public officials would have no fewer rights under the 
First Amendment than sex offenders to access social networks. An outright ban on 
using a certain tool to communicate could operate as a prior restraint and may face 
challenges by public officials asserting their free speech rights to use the 
communication tools in an unofficial capacity. In Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. White, the Supreme Court struck down the Minnesota Supreme Court’s canon of 
conduct that limited speech about political or legal disputes of candidates for 
judicial election, stating that the state could not overcome the strict scrutiny test in 
its requirement that judicial candidates could not comment on legal or political 
matters in the interest of maintaining judicial impartiality.46 Elected public officials 
have relied on this ruling to argue that they have stronger First Amendment rights 
than government employees making statements pursuant to their job duties. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized this in Rangra v. Brown, 
finding protection for the speech of elected government officials “is robust and no 
less strenuous than that afforded to the speech of citizens in general.”47 
                                               
40 Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596, 607 (M.D. La. 2012). 
41 State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 743-44 (N.C. 2015). 
42 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 U.S. 1730, 1737-38 (2017). 
43 Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596. 
44 See Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D. Neb. 2012). 
45 Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 750. 
46 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
47 Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2009). The court found that the criminal 
provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act were “content-based regulations of speech that require 
the state to satisfy the strict scrutiny test in order to uphold them.” Id. at 521. However, the same 
court’s decision in Asgiersson v. Abbott four years later upheld the Texas Open Meetings Act from 
a similar First Amendment challenge by government officials. See Asgeirsson v. Abbott, 696 F.3d 
454 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1249 (2013). Scholars have argued that because open 
meetings laws of this kind are content-based, they should be reviewed using strict scrutiny rather 
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Compared to elected public officials, government employees have limited 
First Amendment protection for their speech while on the job. In Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected “the notion that the First Amendment 
shields from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their 
professional duties.”48 As such, communications sent in one’s official capacity via 
encrypted or ephemeral messaging apps that would typically be covered by public 
records laws would receive limited First Amendment protection. These are not the 
acts of a government employee in his or her role as a citizen, an essential element 
for asserting the First Amendment right in this context. These tools would not be 
used in furtherance of the government employee’s “opportunit[y] to contribute to 
public debate,” but rather to his or her conduct in official duties.49 
Courts have allowed some restriction of public official speech in another 
context – open meetings laws. Public officials in Texas challenged the criminal 
provisions of the state’s Open Meetings Act50 on First Amendment grounds, 
arguing that it “criminalizes all private speech among a quorum of a governing 
body that is about public policy, even if such speech does not lead to corruption.”51 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument in Asgeirsson 
v. Abbott, finding that the section criminalizing public officials’ potential Open 
Meetings Act dodges was content-neutral, was not overbroad or vague, and 
adequately supported the goals of public disclosure laws “such as increasing 
transparency, fostering trust in government, and ensuring that all members of a 
governing body may take part in a discussion of public business.”52 Similarly, state 
legislatures have revised open meetings laws and state attorneys general have 
issued rulings to clarify that certain uses of technology by public officials may 
violate the law. Arizona, for instance, defines a meeting as a “gathering, in person 
or through technological devices, of a quorum of a public body,”53 and the attorney 
general has clarified that circumventing the Open Meetings Law by using email to 
avoid a quorum or other aspects of the law “will subject the members of the public 
body and others to sanctions.”54 In Florida, where meetings of two or more 
members of a public body constitutes a meeting subject to the state’s Sunshine Law, 
                                               
than intermediate scrutiny to allow some room for private discussion by public officials. See 
Steven J. Mulroy, Sunshine’s Shadow: Overbroad Open Meetings Laws as Content-Based Speech 
Restrictions Distinct from Disclosure Requirements, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 135 (2015). 
48 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). 
49 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968). 
50 Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 551.144 (West 2017). 
51 Asgeirsson v. Abbott, 696 F.3d at 464.  
52 Id. 
53 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-431(4)(a) (effective Aug. 3, 2018). 
54 Ariz. Att'y Gen. Op. 105-004, 1-2 (2005).  
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the attorney general opined that the use of computer-based technology by county 
commissioners “to communicate among themselves on issues pending before the 
board” would violate state law.55 A 2009 revision to the Massachusetts Open 
Meeting Law limited remote participation in meetings by public officials, which 
the attorney general advised included bans on participation via “text messaging, 
instant messaging, email, and web chat without audio.”56 
The logic of these limits on public official use of technology from attorney 
general opinions and in the Asgeirsson case – that public officials’ free speech 
rights may be suborned to serve the interest in transparent governance in statutes 
that require disclosure – may plausibly extend to efforts to restrict government use 
of certain technological tools that, even when used legally by a citizen, would allow 
public officials to sidestep open records laws. This may be particularly true in the 
case of ephemeral messaging apps such as Snapchat and Confide, which by default 
make detection of their messages extremely difficult if not impossible. As Professor 
Allison Stanger noted, “Since Confide is explicitly designed to eliminate a paper 
trail, its use creates at least the appearance of misconduct, if not the reality.”57 
While there may be theoretical value for a ban on public official use of 
encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps, and even if such a ban would be 
permissible under the First Amendment,58 it would have problems in practice. First, 
not all government officials and employees will be using government-issued 
devices to do work, making monitoring of device use difficult when government 
employees use personal devices and the apps on them for both personal and work 
purposes. While government agency heads may frown upon employees using their 
own smartphones for work purposes in general,59 the Obama administration in 2012 
acknowledged the reality of this practice, offering guidance to federal agencies to 
help them develop “bring your own device” (BYOD) policies, noting employees’ 
“increased mobility and better integration of their personal and work lives” as well 
as “the flexibility to work in a way that optimizes their productivity.”60 Second, as 
                                               
55 Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 89-39, 2 (1989).  
56 MASS ATT’Y GEN., OPEN MEETING LAW GUIDE, 14 (Mar. 18, 2015), 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/government/oml/oml-guide.pdf.  
57 Newman, supra note 32. 
58 One could imagine, for example, government employees arguing that a ban on using legal 
messaging apps for government purposes would be broader than necessary to ensure the purpose 
of transparency laws, particularly in light of the archiving requirements mentioned in the next 
section, infra. 
59 Amrita Jayakumar, Report: Government Agencies Don’t Like ‘Bring-Your-Own-Device’ Policy, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-it/report-government-
agencies-arent-thrilled-about-bring-your-own-device-policy/2015/04/28/715fc962-edc0-11e4-
8abc-d6aa3bad79dd_story.html?utm_term=.223c1e25b43d.  
60 THE WHITE HOUSE, DIGITAL SERV. ADVISORY GRP., BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE 
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every teenager knows, hiding or quickly deleting apps on smartphones is not 
difficult, making it possible for government employees to either install an app or 
create secret folders making detection of the apps difficult.61 Spot checks such as 
the one the White House spokesman conducted could be easily sidestepped for a 
government staffer expecting such events. And third, more about wisdom than 
practicality, is acknowledging that using encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps 
may have benefits to providing better, more transparent government by providing 
whistleblowers a more secure channel to contact journalists or advocates when they 
want to report government abuse. After Garcetti, some legal scholars feared a 
chilling effect on whistleblowers. As Drechsel noted, “[i]f government employees 
can be disciplined without First Amendment limits for job-related speech, 
government employers now have another tool to discourage, intimidate and punish 
whistleblowers and leakers, as well as to control employees whose primary work is 
public communication.”62 Drechsel considered the risk for public employees who 
could be punished for speaking in ways critical of their government employers, thus 
threatening the free flow of information. A ban on encrypted and ephemeral 
messaging apps, enforceable by either legislated criminal penalties or judicial 
contempt sanctions, would be a similar deterrent. Without GPG encryption, Edward 
Snowden would have been subject to higher risk for detection when he leaked 
records documenting government surveillance abuses; mobile apps that provide 
similar avenues for government employees, while possibly subverting freedom of 
information laws, may at the same time help with a different method of oversight. 
As such, an outright ban on government employee use of encrypted and 
ephemeral messaging apps would likely be permissible under First Amendment 
limits of government employee speech, though it would present some practical and 
policy challenges. The National Archives Records Administration (NARA), which 
oversees federal records management including compliance with the Federal 
Records and the Freedom of Information Act, has announced as much in its record-
keeping guidance, noting, “[s]imply prohibiting the use of electronic messaging 
accounts to conduct agency business is difficult to enforce and does not 
                                               
(Aug.23, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/digitalgov/bring-your-own-device.  
61 See, e.g., Mike Wehner, How to Completely Hide Any App or Folder on Your iPhone or iPad, 
ENGADGET (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.engadget.com/2014/03/26/how-to-completely-hide-any-
app-or-folder-on-your-iphone-or-ipad/; Ben Woods, How to Securely Hide Your Files and Apps 
on Android, ANDROIDPIT (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.androidpit.com/how-to-hide-your-files-
and-apps-on-android.  
62 Robert E. Drechsel, The Declining First Amendment Rights of Government News Sources: How 
Garcetti v. Ceballos Threatens the Flow of Newsworthy Information, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 129, 
139 (2011). 
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acknowledge the ways employees communicate.”63 A more palatable avenue to 
manage government use of encrypted and ephemeral apps may instead be adapting 
existing record-keeping and archiving plans to address these issues. 
  
B. Adapt and Enhance Archiving Policies 
 
In response to the widespread use of email for government purposes, state 
and federal government agencies have outlined requirements for archiving emails, 
either through modifications of freedom of information laws or agency policies. 
Text messaging, on the other hand, has been a bit more problematic for records 
management and archiving by government agencies.64 This presents potential 
problems in the context of encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps, which are 
essentially a form of text messaging made even more difficult to manage and 
archive. 
There is no question that text messages are covered by public records laws 
at both the state and federal levels as a form of electronic communication, and the 
use of personal devices does not alter the reach of public records laws to text 
messages when they are used for government purposes. As Senat explained in his 
examination of the application of public records laws to private ownership of 
devices by government employees, most courts and attorneys general “have 
rejected the notion that a government official’s ownership of a device is more 
important than the substance of the information” that was being communicated on 
that device.65 What matters is whether “official government business” is being 
transacted on the device; if so, then the messages in question, regardless of format 
or device ownership, are subject to public records laws.66 
NARA detailed archiving and retention strategies for chat/instant 
messaging, text messaging, voicemail messaging, and other messaging platforms 
(including Snapchat and WhatsApp) in a bulletin sent to agency heads in 2015, with 
the purpose of providing guidance for compliance with the Federal Records Act 
                                               
63 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, BULLETIN 2015-02 (July 29, 2015), 
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2015/2015-02.html.  
64 See Sandra F. Chance & Christina M. Locke, Struggling with Sunshine: Analyzing the Impact of 
Technology on Compliance with Open Government Laws Using Florida as a Case Study, 21 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1 (2010); Cheryl Cooper, Sending the Wrong 
Message: Technology, Sunshine Law, and the Public Record in Florida, 39 STETSON L. REV. 411 
(2010). 
65 Joey Senat, Whose Business Is It: Is Public Business Conducted on Officials’ Personal 
Electronic Devices Subject to State Open Records Laws?, 19 COMM. L. & POL’Y 293, 322 (2014). 
66 Id.  
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and the Freedom of Information Act.67 This mandated agencies to have a records 
schedule for deletion of electronic messages, with the warning that “unscheduled 
records must be treated as permanent.” Additionally, the bulletin encouraged 
agencies to “determine a minimum time frame to keep electronic messages” in a 
“searchable and retrievable manner,” with the recognition that agencies would need 
to do this regardless of whether the messaging system was in house or was created 
by a third party.68 But the lengths of these schedules are unclear and vary based on 
the kind and purpose of the record. In the context of emails, for example, NARA 
has noted that schedules may allow for the immediate deletion of “transitory” 
emails, while some agencies may retain emails “for decades and then transferred to 
NARA for permanent preservation,” while in other cases, it may be appropriate for 
an agency to retain emails for one year “to meet audit and access requirements.”69 
As such, records retention policies at the federal level have created some 
confusion. In 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was audited after 
a conservative watchdog and U.S. Representative Lamar Smith alleged that EPA 
employees, including the top administrator, had improperly deleted thousands of 
text messages about official business to avoid compliance with the Federal Records 
Act and the Freedom of Information Act.70 The EPA’s Office of Inspector General 
found that agency employees sent 3.1 million text messages over a 12-month period 
on government-issued devices as well as uncountable numbers more on non-agency 
devices that may also have been subject to federal records laws.71 While the audit 
did not find intentional wrongdoing on the part of EPA employees, it found several 
problems with compliance, such as a lack of procedure for the agency’s “FOIA 
personnel” or other staff to examine text messaging that may need to be retained as 
a record on a regular basis, with such searches ranging from every 20 days to 
“periodically (at least monthly).”72 Further, employee devices included defaults for 
automatic text message deletion “after 30 days, one year, or forever,” with 
                                               
67 NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., BULLETIN 2015-02 (July 29, 2015), 
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2015/2015-02.html.  
68 Id. 
69 NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., BULLETIN 2014-06 (Sept. 15, 2014), 
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2014/2014-06.html.  
70 See Timothy Cama, GOP Chairman Subpoenas EPA on Texts, THE HILL (Mar. 25, 2015, 4:45 
PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/236955-gop-chairman-subpoenas-epa-on-texts.  
71 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, CONGRESSIONALLY 
REQUESTED AUDIT: EPA NEEDS TO IMPROVE PROCESSES FOR PRESERVING TEXT MESSAGES AS 
FEDERAL RECORDS, Rep. No. 17-P-0062, 1-2 (Dec. 21, 2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/_epaoig_20161221-17-p-0062.pdf.  
72 Id. at 9. 
 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET • VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2019 
Killer Apps: Vanishing Messages, Encrypted Communications, and Challenges to 
Freedom of Information Laws when Public Officials “Go Dark” 
 
16 
employees varying in their settings, including one high-level administrator who 
configured his government-issued phone to delete all texts after 30 days.73 
Similar challenges are present at the state level, where records retention 
schedules “vary greatly.”74 A review of email schedules in 2014, for example, noted 
that Pennsylvania allows purging of state employee emails after five days, while 
New York automatically deletes after 90 days, and North Carolina keeps all 
executive branch emails for five years.75 An audit by a coalition of newspapers and 
television stations in North Carolina revealed difficulties in receiving the text 
messages reporters requested under the state’s Public Records Act in January 2017. 
While all agencies responded and several provided records, some said their top 
officials did not use text messaging, while others noted that they did not have 
retention or archiving policies, including the state auditor. The authors concluded, 
“it’s clear that getting access to those public records depends largely on the 
goodwill of those department heads.”76 An audit by journalists of Florida agencies 
in 2016 had similar results, showing some confusion among officials, as one city 
attorney declared that text messages of public officials were not public records. 
“Depending on what county (the public officials are) in, you may wait a long time 
or pay a hefty fee to find out what they’ve typed. And even then, you have to trust 
some when they say they didn’t send any texts,” the journalists explained.77 
The current state of open records laws, at both the state and federal level, 
reflects the difficulty in retaining and archiving government text messages, even 
without considering the practical challenges presented by encrypted and ephemeral 
messaging apps. In Texas, for example, the Library and Archives Commission sets 
the state’s records retention schedules (RRS) as a guide for agencies to use in 
establishing their own internal schedules, with required minimums for which 
records must be kept before they may be destroyed or otherwise archived.78 The 
default retention period is one year from the date a record is created, though the 
                                               
73 Id. at 16-17. 
74 Jenni Bergal, Save or Delete? Official Email Policies Vary by State, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
STATELINE (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/10/30/save-or-delete-official-email-policies-vary-by-state.  
75 Id. 
76 Mark Binker et al., Lawsuits, Appointments and ‘a Wreck’: Texts Offer Glimpses into How NC 
Government Works, NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 13, 2017, 8:11 PM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article138062978.html.  
77 Eliot Kleinberg, Text Messages by Local Officials Muddy Public-Records Law, MIAMI HERALD 
(Mar. 10, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article65529447.html.  
78 TEXAS STATE LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES COMMISSION, TEXAS STATE RECORDS RETENTION 
SCHEDULE, 4TH ED. (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/sites/default/files/public/tslac/slrm/recordspubs/RRS%202016-08-
31_final.pdf.  
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RRS are somewhat vague about this, noting that “transitory information” such as 
electronic communications should be retained “until the purpose of the record has 
been fulfilled,” and mentions nothing specifically about text messages or 
messaging applications.79 The level of detailed guidance that would need to be 
provided to a Capstone-like coordinator or records custodian in each government 
office would need to be greatly enhanced in order to adequately capture and retain 
difficult records such as ephemeral messages on Snapchat and Confide, or 
managing encrypted messaging services such as WhatsApp.  
At the federal level, the NARA suggested following the “Capstone 
Approach” that it developed in 2013 to address email retention of federal agencies, 
which allows agencies to rely more on automation and to create schedules for 
retention and archiving based on the “work and/or position” of each government 
employee.80 For example, an agency could designate that messages from “the 
accounts of officials at the top of an agency or an organizational subcomponent” be 
retained permanently, while messages of lower-level employees may be kept for a 
shorter period of time.81 This approach potentially shifts the burden to individual 
account holders and their staffers to self-report and monitor their own compliance 
as each agency determines through its own policy. One practical approach for 
agencies would be to create policies in which employees must voluntarily disclose 
which messaging apps they use, both on their government-issued and personal 
devices, and that records custodians or other staffers charged with oversight set up 
schedules for regular backup and archiving of those texts. In the case of encrypted 
messaging, the policy could require that the records custodian be provided the keys, 
which could be used to decrypt any messaging for review and release upon a proper 
open records request. 
However, this does not entirely get around the problems uncovered in the 
state audits in North Carolina and Florida – reliance on the good faith behavior of 
public officials to comply with records retention and release policies that are poorly 
defined and have little consequence for non-compliance. Actions such as the 2016 
investigation into the EPA and the House Oversight Committee’s requests to 
federal agency heads to document agency policies on retention of messaging will 
put pressure on agencies to comply. The emergence of encrypted and ephemeral 
messaging apps makes such oversight difficult, particularly if the apps are being 
used by public employees deliberately to hide from public scrutiny. 
                                               
79 Id. at 21. 
80 NAT’L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., BULLETIN 2013-02 (Aug. 29, 2013), 
https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/bulletins/2013/2013-02.html. 
81 Id.  
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As such, while enhanced electronic records management and archiving 
rules should certainly be encouraged to ensure that government communications 
are available under state and federal freedom of information laws, relying on these 
policies to overcome the aforementioned obstacles threatens to fall short of the 
laws’ transparency goals. And while reasonable oversight policies may be put in 
place for archiving and releasing encrypted messaging, the records management 
policies mentioned above still do not provide a practical way to handle archiving 
of disappearing messages in ephemeral apps. To tackle that problem, one possible 
solution may be to place a greater burden on third-party service providers.  
  
C. Treat App Developers as Quasi-Governmental Entities 
 
Freedom of information laws generally include some provision that extends 
transparency principles to private entities that serve government functions, though 
there is a lot of variance in the extent to which such quasi-governmental entities are 
covered. In general, a purely private business is not subject to public records laws; 
instead, the laws require some nexus between the private entity and the government, 
usually involving a level of government funding and function performed by the 
entity. The growth in privatization of services often provided by government that 
are now assigned out to private contractors – such as bus services for public schools, 
security and imprisonment of inmates, and fundraising for public universities – has 
led to conflicts over attempts to access the records created by those entities while 
doing government-like work.82 
To be clear, there is not currently a valid legal argument to be made that 
developers of ephemeral messaging apps are subject to state or federal open records 
laws as a quasi-governmental agency. However, the theory underpinning these laws 
– that private entities providing important services to government that would 
typically be performed by government may be subject to open records laws – could 
be adopted by legislators to provide an avenue for public oversight of government 
communication that is otherwise difficult, if not impossible, for reasons mentioned 
in the previous sections of this article. Shifting the burden of oversight to the entity 
with easier access to these records – the companies themselves – on the theory that 
they are acting in a limited quasi-governmental capacity may fill some of the gap 
in access laws and regulations. 
                                               
82 See Rani Gupta, Privatization v. The Public’s Right to Know, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 1-5 (Summer 2007), 
https://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/PRIVATIZATION.pdf. 
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The key elements that access laws typically require to establish that an 
entity is serving in a quasi-governmental role are, to put it simply, function and 
funding. The entity must be performing some kind of government-related task, and 
the government must be providing financial support to the entity.83 In a broad sense, 
ephemeral messaging apps may be considered to be serving a government function 
by enabling a certain kind of privacy-protecting communication otherwise 
unavailable through official government channels such as email systems. Consider 
public officials who use private email services. For example, when she was 
governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin was found to have been using two personal Yahoo 
email accounts to conduct government business in a way that unlawfully 
sidestepped the state’s open records laws.84 In this situation, the relationship 
between the email service user and the provider did not automatically turn the 
provider into a quasi-governmental agency. Rather, the government agency 
responding to a request processed it by receiving the emails in question from the 
providers and screening them before release. Regardless, the materials were in the 
possession of a non-government third party, which made retrieval more difficult. 
That said, private email service providers are not a perfect parallel for 
ephemeral messaging services such as Snapchat and Confide, which do not conduct 
the same kind of archiving. In its guidance to law enforcement agencies that may 
be seeking access to Snaps, Snapchat notes that “we delete each Snap from our 
servers once all recipients have viewed it,” and unopened messages are deleted after 
30 days, unless users put the content in their “Memories” folder for preservation.85 
Even the metadata about Snapchat messages – that is, logs of messages sent and 
received, which do not include the actual content – are only retained for 31 days by 
                                               
83 In some cases, statutes also require the government to exert a level of control or authority over 
the private body. This is the case in the federal government, which restricts FOIA to certain 
executive branch agencies, with a narrow definition of agency. In Dong v. Smithsonian Institution, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Smithsonian, despite 
ties to government on its board and its federally allocated funds, was not an “agency” under the 
federal Privacy Act because it was neither “government-controlled” nor otherwise established in 
or by the executive branch. The court noted that the language and history defining “agency” in the 
Privacy Act was similar to the language in the Freedom of Information Act, recognizing five 
categories of establishments that would qualify as an “agency” (“any executive department, 
military department, Government corporation, or Government controlled corporation” or “other 
establishment in the executive branch”). Dong v. Smithsonian Institution, 125 F.3d 877, 878 (D.C. 
1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 922 (1998). 
84 Matea Gold, Sarah Palin Emails: Alaska Set to Release a New Trove of Documents from Palin’s 
Governorship, L.A. TIMES, (June 9, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/09/news/la-pn-
palin-emails-20110609.  
85 Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide, 9 (Oct. 11, 2016), https://storage.googleapis.com/snap-
inc/privacy/lawenforcement.pdf. 
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Snapchat.86 Confide merely notes that it may be required to disclose account 
information “in response to lawful requests by public authorities” or otherwise to 
“court orders and subpoenas,” without any more detail about its retention policies 
or ability of law enforcement to obtain content or metadata from communications.87 
However, despite these attempts to guarantee users that messages and photos sent 
through the ephemeral services will disappear permanently, people have found 
ways to hack into Snapchat, leading to massive privacy breaches. Snapchat settled 
a dispute with the Federal Trade Commission in 2014 involving lax security that 
allowed people to use third-party apps to infiltrate Snapchat photos and videos, 
which specifically enabled people to take screenshots and store them without the 
sender’s knowledge.88 While that settlement was ongoing, Snapchat was hit by 
hackers who published nearly 100,000 photos that users expected had 
disappeared.89 Snapchat said that this was not a result of hackers accessing their 
servers, but rather use of third-party apps that were not allowed under its Terms of 
Use.90 If hackers are able to find ways to infiltrate an ephemeral messaging app to 
make its messages permanent, it is certainly possible that government records 
custodians could work with the company on a legal solution to do the same for 
public records purposes, or that the company could anticipate such requests and 
provide more thorough archiving services in certain situations. 
Recognizing a limited quasi-governmental relationship when government 
employees use ephemeral messaging services would help enable such solutions. 
However, it would require legislation as, typically, these laws have been found not 
to extend to private bodies without substantial connections between the business 
and the government. In one high-profile case, Texas law deemed not-for-profit 
collegiate athletic associations were not “governmental bod[ies],” which include 
“the part, section, or portion of an organization, corporation, commission, 
committee, institution, or agency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part 
by public funds.”91 Interpreting what at the time was called the Texas Open Records 
Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to extend the definition 
of “government body” to the NCAA or the Southwest Conference in connection 
                                               
86Id. at 8.  
87 Privacy Policy, CONFIDE, https://getconfide.com/privacy (last visited September 22, 2018).  
88 See FTC, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against Snapchat (Dec. 31, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-charges-
against-snapchat.  
89 See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, 98,000 Hacked Snapchat Photos and Videos Posted Online, 
MASHABLE (Oct. 13, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/10/13/the-snappening-photos-videos-
posted/#PIZJ7EOMZuqu.  
90 See id. 
91 Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.003(1)(A)(xii) (2018). 
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with records requests made to those institutions regarding football recruiting 
violations at Southern Methodist University.92 While the court found that “gate 
receipts and television revenue paid” to the NCAA and the Southwest Conference 
were “public funds,” it did not find that the funds extended beyond “specific, 
measurable services” typical of a normal quid-pro-quo contract.93 
Open records laws typically also require private businesses to have a close 
connection to the government body, which would not be the case for encrypted and 
ephemeral messaging apps absent additional legislation. For instance, a “non-profit 
corporation that provides emergency medical transportation services” such as 
ambulance and helicopter flights was found not to be a “government body” under 
the Texas Public Information Act. Even though the company received public funds, 
the threshold the court applied was whether the relationship is such that the 
company is “so closely associated with the governmental body that the private 
entity falls within” the act. In this case, the court found that the relationship was an 
arms-length contract with sufficient quid pro quo, and as such was merely an 
exchange of payment for services rather than establishing the company as a 
“government body” for public records purposes.94 
While establishing a private entity as doing a public function may be 
somewhat difficult, funding is perhaps even more so, and a problematic one for 
policymakers who may be interested in extending the theory of quasi-government 
operations to external communication services. 
The funding of a quasi-government entity typically does not have to be 
entirely from the state. For instance, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the 
Indianapolis Convention and Visitors Association, a “private not-for-profit 
corporation that receives revenue from both public and private sources,” was a 
public entity “subject to the Indiana Access to Public Records Act.”95 The law was 
drafted broadly to allow public inspection of records of an entity if it is funded in 
whole or in part through public funds or tax appropriations, thus making it subject 
to audit by the State Board of Accounts. But the court made it clear that a “fee-for-
services” arrangement would not have been enough to make the association subject 
to the Public Records Law.96 If an entity is merely performing a service as part of 
                                               
92 Kneeland v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 850 F.2d 224, 231 (5th Cir. 1988). 
93 Id. at 228-30. 
94 CareFlite v. Rural Hill Emergency Med. Serv., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex. Ct. App. 11th 
Dist. 2012). 
95 Indianapolis Convention & Visitors Ass’n, Inc. v. Indianapolis Newspapers, 577 N.E.2d 208, 
209 (Ind. 1991). 
96 Id. at 212. 
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an arms-length negotiated contract, it is usually not enough to establish the entity 
as quasi-governmental and subject to open records laws.97 
Because the government does not fund developers of encrypted and 
ephemeral messaging developers, they are not subject to current public records 
laws. Ephemeral messaging apps are services that are free for anyone with a 
smartphone to download and use, at least on a small scale. Snapchat is free for 
users, and derives its funding from both advertising and from providing 
opportunities for users to engage with brands.98 The basic services of Confide are 
free for individual and small group users, with limited fee-based services (such as 
message retraction and priority support). They also offer a “pro” version for larger 
groups and businesses, which costs $15 per user per month, and even a variably-
priced solution for large organizations.99 Unless government agencies took the 
unlikely step of paying for these kinds of services, there would not constitute the 
type of financial support typically required to make private entities subject to open 
records laws on a quasi-government theory. Even then, if the government were 
merely contracting out a service for payment, it would still not likely establish that 
the entity was acting in a quasi-governmental capability.   
As such, at both the levels of function and funding, the theory of quasi-
governmental activity allowing public records law access to ephemeral messaging 
apps is dubious, unless legislators or policymakers were to consider targeted 
revisions that would allow such access by necessity. Such a move would necessarily 
require both that the ephemeral messaging developers maintain an archive for 
accounts operated by government employees and would require special access, 
either by the records custodians or direct request from the public, to facilitate 
inspection and copying of those records. The approach would also have to be very 
narrow to avoid security lapses and risks for abuse by government investigators. 
One potential example in limiting the scope of access to records held by third 
parties is Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Law, which provides a means of access to 
“a public record that is not in the possession of the agency but is in the possession 
of a party with whom the agency has contracted to perform a governmental function 
on behalf of the agency, and which directly relates to the function of the government 
                                               
97 See, e.g., CareFlite v. Rural Hill Emergency Med. Serv., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 11th Dist. 2012). 
98 See Alex Barinka & Sarah Frier, Snapchat Is Justifying Its $20 Billion Valuation by 
Emphasizing User Engagement, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2017, 5:19PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-20/snap-said-to-stress-addicted-users-to-
justify-20-billion-value. 
99 Products & Pricing, CONFIDE, https://getconfide.com/products (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).  
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agency.”100 The Pennsylvania law is limited only to those records that are of a 
government nature, not to all records in possession of the third party.101 Requests 
for records go to the agency, which if it determines if the record is open, and 
consequently, if it must acquire copies from the third party to pass on to the 
requester.102 
Efforts by legislators to require mandatory archiving by private companies 
have been met with resistance. The European Union attempted to do this through 
the Directive on Mandatory Retention of Communications Traffic Data in 2006, 
which would have required member states to adopt guidelines for electronic 
communication companies to retain data for six months to two years “for the 
purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime.”103 In 
2014, the European Court of Justice struck down the data retention directive, 
finding it infringed privacy rights of citizens and did not provide sufficient 
safeguards to prevent against abuse and unlawful access of the data.104 
Another possibility would be legislation which requires apps to have a 
“government user mode” that would automatically retain such users’ texts in their 
archives, with the app creator acting as a quasi-government operator subject to state 
or federal freedom of information laws. Yet another possibility, from a proactive 
transparency perspective, would be legislation that requires communication app 
developers to build in a feature that automatically synchronizes communications to 
or from government employees105 to the state or federal agency records custodian 
or archiving service for retention, in line with the “Capstone Approach” outlined in 
the previous section.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When Utah was in the process of revising its Government Records Access 
and Management Act in 2011, one of its more controversial provisions was closing 
access to private text messages and instant messages of public officials. Charles 
Davis, at the time the director of the National Freedom of Information Coalition, 
                                               
100 65 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 67.506(d)(1) (2016). 
101 65 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 67.506(d)(2). 
102 65 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 67.506(d)(3). 
103 Council Directive 2006/24/EC, art. 4, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006L0024&from=en.  
104 Case C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0293&qid=1539222847866&from=EN. 
105 Daxton R. Stewart & Charles N. Davis, Bringing Back Full Disclosure: A Call for Dismantling 
FOIA, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 515, 529-530 (2016). 
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called it a “lobbyist’s fantasy,” expecting to have a conversation such as, “give me 
your cell phone number, Mr. Legislator, and we can have a private text conversation 
24/7, even if you’re on the floor.”106 The absurdity of such a possibility was just 
one reason open government advocates and others rallied against the revised law, 
which was repealed just weeks after it was enacted.107 
The “lobbyist’s fantasy” scenario remains a possibility under any state or 
federal open records law, though such laws make it clear that those text messages 
must be archived and available for public inspection, and record-keeping policies 
have been adjusted to adapt to the technology with moderate success. But what 
options do government agencies have when dealing with messages that are 
encrypted and vanish by default, leaving no trace that a communication ever 
happened in the first place? The “lobbyist’s fantasy” is a reality that open 
government advocates must contend with when dealing with encrypted and 
ephemeral messaging services. 
None of the three policy approaches examined here seem to provide an easy 
solution. A ban on government use of encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps—
even if it is deemed constitutionally viable under the First Amendment because it 
is necessary to ensure transparency—faces practical enforcement challenges that 
are common to public records and meetings laws.108 Modifying existing archiving 
and record-keeping policies is a potentially viable solution, especially regarding 
encryption should a custodian be required to keep keys and decrypted copies of 
messages routinely. Successfully enacting such policies, however, relies on 
voluntary compliance and cooperation by the very same government employees 
who may be using encrypted and ephemeral messaging apps to cover their tracks 
or otherwise dodge oversight required by freedom of information laws. Extending 
a theory of quasi-governmental action to app developers—which is not currently 
valid as a legal argument and would thus require legislative action to shift the 
burden of record-keeping and archiving to the companies providing encrypted and 
                                               
106 Nate Carlisle, Nation Criticizes Utah’s Call for Records Secrecy, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 7, 
2011), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/home/51374867-76/utah-government-
records-law.html.csp.  
107 Dennis Romboy & Marjorie Cortez, Utah Lawmakers Repeal Controversial Open Records 
Law, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705369372/Utah-
lawmakers-repeal-controversial-open-records-law.html.  
108 See, e.g., Michele Bush Kimball, Law Enforcement Rec. Custodians’ Decision-Making Behav. 
in Response to Fla. Pub. Rec. Law, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313 (2003); Daxton R. "Chip" Stewart, 
Let the Sunshine In, or Else: An Examination of the “Teeth” of State and Fed. Open Meetings and 
Open Rec. Laws, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 265 (2010); and Charles N. Davis, Milagros Rivera-
Sanchez & Bill F. Chamberlin, Sunshine Laws and Jud. Discretion: A Proposal for Reform of 
State Sunshine Law Enforcement Provisions, 28 URB. LAW. 41 (1996).  
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ephemeral messaging services—also faces substantial practical hurdles, not the 
least of which is the fact that the companies themselves try to protect their users’ 
privacy by rapidly deleting messages and metadata from their own servers. 
Ephemeral messaging solutions are, indeed, potentially the killer apps of freedom 
of information laws. As Confide notes in its messaging to customers, the app was 
created “to bring off-the-record professional communication to the digital 
world.”109 Undermining public records laws is a side effect of their success. 
So, what’s the answer? As legal scholar Orin Kerr quipped on Twitter, 
“Most underused answer in law: ‘I don’t know.’”110 Each of the three 
aforementioned options may offer some guidance to legislators and policy-makers 
trying to uphold the spirit of public records laws. Doing nothing is, perhaps, the 
worst option because it allows the “lobbyist’s fantasy” scenario to advance 
unchecked. The best solution may be educating the public, including government 
officials, about the underlying purpose of freedom of information laws and their 
role in democracy. While compliance with open records laws is historically spotty 
at best, what compliance there is may have less to do with fear of the largely 
ineffective enforcement mechanisms and more to do with the expected behavior of 
public officials in American democracy. We seem to be in a moment when these 
democratic norms that have compelled certain behaviors are being tested, if not 
entirely cast aside. If the law does not compel release of government records, at the 
serious risk of a forceful penalty, then the request for the documents in question 
may go ignored. The shift to a culture of consequence-free lack of compliance with 
open records laws, somewhat reflective of the infamous Ashcroft Memo issued in 
2001 that promised Department of Justice backing for any federal agency that 
denied access,111 emboldens those in government who would keep its citizens in 
the dark through deliberate subversion of the law through use of encryption and 
impermanent messaging apps. 
A better approach may be adopting a strategy similar to the federal email 
“Capstone Approach” to management of communication apps and accounts on 
personal and government-issued devices, which is revised for the technology at 
hand. A combination of limited bans on use of ephemeral messaging apps by public 
officials, as well as enhanced record keeping guidelines and a legislated archiving 
requirement along the lines of the quasi-governmental theory offered above could 
                                               
109 Frequently Asked Questions, CONFIDE, https://getconfide.com/faq (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).  
110 Orin Kerr (@OrinKerr), TWITTER (Apr. 1, 2017, 11:46 AM), 
https://twitter.com/OrinKerr/status/848214931887534080.  
111 See Ellen Nakashima, Bush View of Secrecy is Stirring Frustration, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 
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work together to ensure citizen access to otherwise vanishing government records. 
Current federal agency approaches have already proven problematic in managing 
non-ephemeral text messaging, so extending this to the state and to ephemeral or 
encrypted messaging may present even greater challenges. 
Encryption is not a bad thing in itself; neither is ephemeral messaging. Both 
of these tools promise privacy and provide citizens a greater ability to discuss 
matters with more security against government intrusion or surveillance, a value 
that enhances the free exchange of ideas in democratic society. While there are 
valuable government uses of these technologies, there are also problematic ones 
that will require complex law and policy discussions to resolve. In this article, the 
author attempted to begin some of those discussions to lead toward the creation 
workable solution in the future. 
